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George MOUSOURAKIS * 
Introduction: Some Comments on the Nature of Comparative-Legal Inquiries 
In the last few decades there has been an increasing tendency among lawyers and jurists 
to look beyond their own fences. While the growing interest in foreign legal systems may 
well be attributed to the dramatic increase of international transactions, this empirical 
parameter to the growth of comparative legal studies accounts only for part of the explanation. 
The other part, at least equally important, has to do with the expectation of obtaining a 
deeper understanding of one's own legal system through the study and comparison of legal 
norms, institutions and principles found in foreign systems. Comparative law enables one 
to perceive the new features and trends of development of modem legal systems in connection 
with scientific-technical progress, integration processes and the growing role of transnational 
and international law. Where forms of social control or organization are in question, values, 
pragmatic considerations, and ethical views provide perspectives in light of which meaningful 
similarities and differences between societies can be identified and their effects upon each 
society's legal order assessed. 
Modem comparative law has gone through three main stages of development. Influenced 
by developments in the biological sciences, linguistics and new theories of social evolution 
during the nineteenth century, comparativists tended to focus, during that time, upon the 
historical development of legal systems in the belief that there exist certain laws of social 
development common to al societies. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a period 
of relative tranquility in Europe, the French scholars Lambert and Saleilles, motivated by 
a desire for the world unification of law, advocated the search for what they referred to as 
the'common stock of legal solutions'from amongst al the legal systems of the civilized 
world. It was quite natural for many comparativists of that time to perceive comparative 
law as a substantive subject, a substantive science with a distinct and self-contained subject-
matter. As such, comparative law was mainly concerned with unraveling the patterns of 
legal development and concepts which were common to al nations. During the early years 
* Senior Lecturer, University of Auckland; Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute and the University of 
Heidelberg (2005). The author would like to record his thanks to Dr E. MacIntosh for his helpful comments 
on an early draft of this paper. 
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of the twentieth century, however, many comparative law scholars, most notably H.C. 
Gutteridge and Rene David, put forward the view that comparative law was no more than 
a method to be employed for diverse purposes in the study of law. On this view, comparative 
law is no more than a means to an end and it was therefore the purposes for which the 
comparative method was to be utilized that should provide the basis of any definition of 
comparative law as a subject. This approach entailed a shift in emphasis from comparative 
law as a science to the uses to which the comparative method could be put in the study of 
law.1) 
It seems to me that those who view comparative law as a method and those who regard 
it as a science look at comparative law from different angles. When speaking of'laws'and 
'rules', the former have in mind normative'laws'and'rules'-the things that lawyers 
commonly work with. The later, on the other hand, tend to perceive law primarily as a 
social phenomenon, and the relationship between law and society as being governed by 
'laws'or'rules', which transcend any one particular legal system. At its simplest level, that 
of the description of differences and similarities between legal systems, the comparative 
method allows us to acquire a better understanding of the characteristic features of particular 
institutions or rules. But as the comparative method becomes more sophisticated, for example, 
where the socio-economic and political structures, historical background and cultural patterns 
which underpin the institutions or rules are taken into account, the comparative method 
begins to produce explanations based on interrelated variables -explanations which become 
progressively more scientific in nature. Scientific comparative law is distinctive among the 
branches of legal science in that it depends primarily upon the comparative method, whereas 
other branches may place greater emphasis on the many other methods of cognition available, 
such as empirical induction or a priori speculation. Thus, although comparative law is 
sometimes identified with legal sociology, it is really more confined. Naturally it does, 
however, support the other branches of legal science and is itself supported by them. 
Now, a distinction may be drawn between three types of comparative-legal inquiry: 
1) By focusing on the uses, aims or purposes of the comparative study, comparativists divided their activities 
into categories such as'descriptive comparative law'or'comparative nomoscopy', signifying the mere 
description of foreign law,'applied comparative law'or'comparative legislation', refering to the use of foreign 
law for the purpose of reforming one's own legal system,'comparative nomothetics', concerned with the 
evaluation of foreign law,'comparative nomogenetics'or'comparative history oflaw', focusing on the evolution 
of legal norms and institutions, and'abstract or speculative comparative law'or'comparative jurisprudence', 
with respect to which the comparative method was designed to be of asistance to sociologists and legal 
philosophers. Se in general, Guteridge, Le droit compare, Paris 1953, 20. The above divisions do not militate 
against the basic unity of comparative law as a scientific method, however. As Gutteridge points out, comparative 
law is not made up of a variety of independent inquiries related to each other only by virtue of the fact that 
they al involve the study of diferent legal systems. The basic feature of comparative law, as a method, is that 
it can be aplied to al types and fields oflegal inquiry. Le droit compare, 1953, 28. And se Langrod, "Quelques 
reflexions methodologiques sur la comparaison en science juridique", RIDComp. 1957, 363. 
55 
Towards a Comparative Theory of Legal Change 
idealistic, realistic and particularistic. According to the idealistic approach, legal order is 
a normative matter, which is present in the factual legal order although it cannot be identified 
with it. The realistic approach, on the other hand, is based upon an empirical view of legal 
order. Both the idealistic and realistic perspectives are concerned with the problem of 
generalization. The study of legal orders brings to light innumerable differences and 
similarities. Should a comparativist strive to arrive at generalizations capable of being applied 
to different legal orders? Idealistic universalism seeks to discover the ideal of law, which 
is present in al legal orders; realistic universalism seeks to reveal the sociological laws 
governing legal phenomena. In spite of their theoretical juxtaposition, both perspectives 
have universalism in common: the are not content with a mere description but they want 
to systematize, to find out general means of explanation in order to account for legal 
phenomena irrespective of time and place. Those who follow a particularistic approach to 
comparative law, by contrast, claim that general principles are too abstract as to serve as 
goals of study. This approach, quite common in the practice of comparative law, tends to 
reduce comparative law to a detailed description of different legal orders. From this point 
of view, in other words, comparison is only a translation of valid legal orders into one 
language. In most cases, however, some kind of intermediate position between universalism 
and particularism is sought, in so far as it is recognised that there are in every legal order 
both general and particular features. 2) It might also be said that the task of legal dogmatics, 
the study of contemporary national law, is to examine particular legal orders at a quite 
concrete level, whereas the level of comparison represents a higher step. 3) According to 
Wittgenstein, a presupposition of definibility is a common characteristic. As applied to legal 
order, this entails perhaps the conception that single legal orders are language games and 
that some of them have such a'family resemblance'that certain common features can be 
found. This view is rather similar to that of comparative law scholars, according to whom 
for a comparison to be meaningful, the objects of the comparison must share certain common 
features, which can serve as the common denominator (tertium comparationis). One might 
thus say that universal and individual features of legal phenomena are different aspects of 
a uniform whole, although both aspects are necessary in order to grasp reality. 
Contemporary comparativists often employ seemingly contradictory approaches, 
combining particularistic with universalistic perspectives. The more general a description 
is, the more phenomena of concrete life it covers, and the better it is as a scientific description, 
but the less does it represent a particular form of life. The exact course of historical events 
2) This reflects the Aristotelian view of legal order as a result partly of natural regularities and laws and partly 
of human wil. 
3) The generalizations of comparative law have a wider scope than those of positive law, but a narrower scope 
than those of a general theory of law. In this respect, comparative law can be said to be the intermediate link 
between legal dogmatics and legal theory. 
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is always individual and can be explained only by reference to its particular elements; but 
the broad outline of the events is subject to general socio-historical laws. Comparative law 
has to deal with very complex phenomena: wide social, cultural and religious diversities, 
not to mention the impact of particular individuals, produce distinctive legal systems, each 
of which must be studied and understood on their own, even ifsome or al systems manifest 
similar traits. In other words, knowledge of the particular, as opposed to knowledge of the 
general, is crucial to the understanding of law and legal institutions. And although legal 
sociology might strive towards a universalist knowledge of law, as does legal philosophy 
in a different sense, comparative law is by its own nature forever bound to vacillate between 
the general and the particular. The comparative process may be described as dialectical, as 
it focuses upon the inter-connection between general principles and concrete observations 
made when these principles have been applied in practice. Thus, the general explanatory 
background is concretized in particular cases; at the same time, a general historical outlook 
enables one to make certain generalizations from particular events within the framework of 
a general model of explanation. 
Scholars agree that comparative legal studies have performed valuable services in 
empirically testing the propositions oflegal theory.4) As Paton has pointed out, it is impossible 
to comprehend jurisprudence without comparative law, since al schools of jurisprudence, 
whether historical, philosophical, sociological or analytical, rely on the comparative method.5) 
The knowledge which jurists depend on when they seek to devise tools for a proper 
construction of legal phenomena can be gained neither by an examination of a single legal 
system, since law transcends national boundaries, nor without comparison. Comparative law 
allows the jurist additional perspectives towards a more complete understanding of law as 
a social phenomenon and, by enriching his intellectual repertory, enables him to better 
accomplish his tasks. Reference should also be made in this connection to the use of 
4) Lawson, F. H., The Comparison, Selected Esays, Oxford 1977, I, 59. 
5) A Textbook of Jurisprudence, 1972, 41. It should be noted here that in civi law thinking there is no real 
equivalent as such to jurisprudence, as the term is generaly understood in common law countries, i.e the study 
of theories concerning the nature of law and legal phenomena (in French the word jurisprudence denotes case 
law). Civil law jurists draw a distinction between legal philosophy, concerned with the values underpinning 
legal institutions and rules, and general theory of law, focusing on the basic concepts, methods, clasification 
schemes and instruments of the law. In the words ofBergel,'general theory oflaw starts out from the observation 
of legal systems, from the research into their permanent elements, from their intelectual articulations, so as to 
extract concepts, techniques, main intelectual constructions and so on;'the philosophy of law, on the other 
hand'is more concerned with philosophy than law'for'it tends to strip law of its technical covering under the 
pretext of beter reaching the essence so as to discover the meta-legal signification, the values that it has to 
pursue, the sense in relation to a total vision of man and the world'. J.-L. Bergel, Theorie ge旭raledu droit, 
2nd edn, 1989, 4. In adition, legal science (scientia juris) is understood to encompass positive law organized 
in such a way that it rationalizes, scientificaly, both law as an empirical object and legal science itself. See on 
this P. Oeianne, Apprendre le droit: Elements pour une pedagogie juridique, I 990, 73 f. 
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comparative analyses in the field of legal history. The history of law studies the sources of 
legal phenomena and the evolution of legal systems and individual legal institutions in 
different historical contexts. It is concerned both with the history of a single legal order and 
the legal history of many societies, the universal history of law. By means of comparisons 
between different systems of law at different stages of development legal historians attempt 
to trace the evolution of legal institutions as well as the historical ties that may exist between 
legal systems. Historical legal analyses utilizing the comparative method are essential for 
the understanding and further development of the law. Without the knowledge derived from 
historical-comparative legal studies it is impossible to investigate contemporary legal 
institutions, as these are in significant measure the product of historical conditions, 
borrowings and mutual influences of legal systems in the past. 
A Comparative Theory of Legal Change? 
Comparative law analyses are connected with the theoretical and historical study of 
law and at the same time, by their very nature, are concerned with the phenomenon of legal 
change. In the following paragraphs problems of legal change and legal stability will be 
considered from the point of view of comparative law. The discussion will focus on aspects 
of the theory oflegal change developed by Professor Alan Watson, one of the most productive 
post-war legal historians. Since the publication of the first edition of his seminal book Legal 
Transpants: An Approach to Comparative Law in 197 4, Watson has produced a large number 
of works on the relationship between law and society and the factors that account for legal 
change. 6) In these he has repeatedly stated his belief that changes in a legal system are due 
to legal transplants: the transfer of legal rules and institutions from one legal system to 
another. The nomadic character or rules proves, according to Watson, that the'idea of a 
close relationship between law and society'is a fallacy. 7) Law is largely autonomous and 
develops by transplanting, not because some rule was the inevitable consequence of the 
social structure, but because the foreign rule was known to those who control law-making 
and who have recognised the apparent benefits that could be derived from it. 8) It should be 
noted here that Watson does not contemplate that rules are borrowed without alteration or 
modification; rather, he indicates that voluntary transplants would almost always -always 
in the case of a major transplant -involve a change in the law largely unconnected with 
6) See e.g. A. Watson,'Aspects of Reception of Law', American Journal of Comparative Law 44,1996, 335; 
"Comparative Law and Legal Change", Cambridge Law Journal, 1978, 313;'Legal Transplants and Law 
Reform', Law Quarterly Review 92, 1976; Society and Legal Change, Philadelphia 1977, 2nd edn 2001; 
Sources of Law, Legal Change, and Ambiguity, Philadelphia 1984; Legal Origins and Legal Change, London 
1991; The Evolution of Western Private Law, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 
7) Legal Transplants, 2nd edn, Athens and London 1993, 108. 
8) "Comparative Law and Legal Change", 3 7 Cambridg e L.J. 1978, 313, 313-15 and 321. 
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particular factors operating within society. 9) Neither does Watson expect that a rule, once 
transplanted, will operate in exactly the same way in which it operated in the country of its 
origin. Against this background, Watson argues that comparative law, understood as a distinct 
intellectual discipline, should be concerned with'the study of the relationship of one legal 
system and its rules with another'.10) Comparative legal studies, in other words, should be 
mainly about'legal transplants'. Watson asserts that comparative law (which he distinguishes 
from a knowledge of foreign law) can enable those actively concerned with law reform to 
understand their historical role and their task better. It makes it possible for them to see 
more clearly whether and how far it is reasonable to borrow from other systems and from 
which systems, and whether it is possible to accept foreign legal rules and institutions with 
modifications or without modifications. Despite the rather far-reaching nature of some of 
his statements, it is important to observe here that Watson has generally confined his studies, 
and the theory of legal change that they have produced, to the development of private law 
in Western countries. 
Watson attempts to construct a comprehensive theory of legal change from ancient 
times to the modem era. He has the qualifications needed: he is a distinguished Romanist. 
An important part of his work is concerned with the worldwide reception of Roman law 
and its admirable longevity as a system under different socio-economic conditions. Roman 
law, as shaped out by the compilers of the Justinianic codification in the sixth century AD, 
has been one of the strongest forces in the development of Western legal systems. Although 
Justinian sought to produce, on the basis of the legal inheritance of the past, an authoritative 
statement of the law of his own day, his system was adopted and applied by most European 
countries during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and in wide areas of Germany and 
other parts of Europe it remained an immediate source of law until the close of the nineteenth 
century. Roman private law was used in Catholic, Calvinist and Lutheran countries. It was 
used in countries whose economic life was dominated by agriculture, but was also applied 
in mercantile centres and, in later years, in countries undergoing a process of industrialization. 
This law, first adopted in Europe, was directly or indirectly, through a European code, 
transplanted in South America, Quebec, Louisiana and a large number of countries in Asia 
and Africa. By why was Roman law adopted? The medieval reception of Roman law was 
in part due to the lack of centralized governments and developed fom叫 legalsystems that 
9) Watson has identified a number of factors that determine which rules wil be borrowed, including: (a) 
acesibility (this pertains to the question of whether the rule is in writing, in a form that is easily found and 
understood, and readily available), (b) habit (once a system becomes used as a quary, it wil be borrowed from 
again, and the more it is borrowed from, the more the right thing to do is to borrow from that system, even 
when the rule that is taken is not necessarily apropriate, (c) chance (e.g., a particular writen source may be 
present in a particular library at a particular time, or lawyers from one country may train in, and become familiar 
with the law of, another country), and (d) the authority and the prestige of the legal system from which rules 
are borrowed. 
10) Legal Transplants, supra note 7 at6. 
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could compete with the comprehensive inheritance of Rome, and in part due to the fact that 
the lands that once were Roman were used to this style of thought and accorded it wisdom 
and authority. A third feature due almost completely to the example of Rome and the Corpus 
Juris Civilis was the desire on the part of most countries to codify their law and the desire 
of later jurists to conform their studies to this example. But Roman law was not adopted 
merely because it was admired, nor because its norms may have been particularly suitable 
for the social conditions in the early European nation-states. In fact many norms of Roman 
law were entirely antiquated. It was, first and foremost, the perceived superiority of Roman 
law as a system that led to the adoption of its norms, even if this adoption was backed by 
a learned tradition that had lasted for centuries.11) As has already been noted, according to 
Watson, comparative law is concerned with the historical relationships between legal orders 
and the destinies of'legal transplants'in different countries. It is on this basis that one may 
identify the factors explaining the change or immutability of law.12) Watson draws attention 
here to the historical dimension of comparative law. Problems, juridical norms and their 
systematic organization are older than (most of) the norms of current law. General doctrines 
are relevant as they furnish the framework of comparative inquiries. This is, of course, partly 
due to the existence of common problems, but also partly due to historical tradition, to the 
fact that Roman law has been an important common denominator of much of the Western 
legal experience. The conceptual system of Roman law is thus an apt tertium comparationis, 
as it constitutes a common basis of the legally organized relationships of life in the 
West.13) 
It has been the experience of the legal historian that underlies Watson's scepticism 
towards the view that law is directly derived from social conditions. According to him, 
11) The common law of England presents an unusual case: once part of the Roman Empire, it nevertheless 
retained a legal system largely independent of the continental Reception. According to Watson, this was due 
to the fact that, although the English jurists were not completely isolated from the Roman influence, the legal 
structure in England was so different from the rest of Europe as to make wholesale borrowing unlikely. This 
factor, combined with several others drawn attention to by Watson, such as the early rise of a legal profession 
trained in the national law and having a common interest with the courts in preserving and promoting that law, 
explain why Roman law had litle effect on the development of English law. Some elements of Roman law 
were introduced in England through the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts, and through the Court of the 
Chancery, which owed its origin to the increasing rigidity displayed by the common law. 
12) Legal Transplants, supra note 7 at 21. By way of illustration, Watson mentions a set of rules concerned 
with matrimonial property, which traveled'from the Visigoths to become the law of the Iberian Peninsula in 
general, migrating then from Spain to California, [ and] from California to other states in the western United 
States'. Ibid at l 08. He adds that if one considers a range of legal systems over a long term'the picture that 
emerge[ s] is of continual massive borrowing… of rules'. Ibid at 107. On this basis he concludes that the 
moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another has now been shown to be the most fertile 
source of legal development, since'most changes in most systems are the result of borrowing.'Ibid at 94. 
13) Legal relationships are to a large extent organized by forms derived from Roman law (such as culpa, con-
tractus, bona .fides etc). One might say that these forms constitute a kind of pre-knowledge for Western legal 
systems. 
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history shows that, because of the nature of the legal profession, legal change in European 
private law has taken place largely by transplantation of legal rules, without this being 
necessarily due to the impact of social structure. Social, economic, and political factors 
affect the shape of the law that is produced only to the extent that they are present in the 
consciousness oflawmakers, i.e. the group oflawyers and jurists who control the mechanisms 
of legal change. The lawmakers'consciousness of these factors may be heightened by 
pressure from other parts of society, but, even then, the lawmakers'response will be 
conditioned by the legal tradition: by their learning, expertise and knowledge oflaw, domestic 
and foreign. Societal pressure may bring about a change in the law, but the resulting legal 
rule will usually be borrowed from a system known to the lawmaker, often with modifications, 
but not always after ful consideration of local conditions. Watson stresses that law is to a 
considerable extend a phenomenon operating at the level of ideology; it is an autonomous 
discipline largely resistant to cultural influences beyond the law itself. From this point of 
view, he argues that it is the law itself that provides the impetus for change. At the same 
time he recognizes that, notwithstanding the fact that a considerable disharmony tends to 
exist between the best rule that the society envisages for itself and the rule that it actually 
has, there is a necessary relationship between law and society. The task of legal theory 
whose starting-point is comparative law is to shed light on this relationship and, in particular, 
to elucidate the inconsistencies between the law actually in force and ideal law, i.e. the law 
that would correspond to the demands of society or its dominant strata. As this suggests, 
Watson's theory is basically idealistic. 
In an article published a few years after Legal Transplants, Watson delineated the 
factors that control the relationship between legal rules and the society in which they 
operate. 14) Consideration of these factors is crucial to understanding the phenomenon of 
legal change. Whilst Watson admits that it is extremely difficult to determine the relative 
weight or impact of each of these factors, he points out that their interaction should a priori 
be assessed as much more important than the relative weighing of the individ叫 factors.In 
this respect, his model may be described as holistic. The factors are the following: 
• Source of law 
• Pressure force 
• Opposition force 
• Transplant bias 
• Law-shaping lawyers 
• Discretion factor 
• Generality factor 
14)'Comparative Law and Legal Change', Cambridge Law Journal 37 (2), 1978, 313-336. Although these factors 
pertain primarily to the Western legal tradition, Watson believes that they are valid also outside this sphere of 
legal culture. 
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• Inertia 
• Felt needs 
Watson recognizes that there may be some common elements in these factors. It could 
indeed even be maintained that some of these factors are -at least when applied to concrete 
contexts of legal change -only different aspects of the same problem. This again is due to 
the inevitable interconnections between the matters considered. Even though one might 
question whether Watson's scheme is the optimal way of presenting a comparative theory 
of legal change, one cannot deny the relevance of the observations that he makes under the 
head of'factors'. I shall therefore give a short account of the factors and the way in which 
they operate. 
a. According to Watson, the course of development of a system of law is influenced by 
the nature of the predominant source or sources of law, whether custom, statute, code, 
judicial precedent or juristic doctrine. Precedent-based law develops more slowly than 
statutory law because such law'must always wait upon events, and, at that, on litigated 
events';'there is no way of defining precisely the ratio decidendi of a particular case' 
for'only when there is a line of cases does it become possible to discover the principle 
underlying even the first case'.15) Thus, precedent-based law is always retrospective, 
whereas statutory law looks forward. While law based on precedent is slow to change, 
statutory law, being more systematic and broader in scope, can be relied upon to 
introduce drastic and speedy reforms. Moreover, development by statute, as having a 
more adequate theoretical basis, can point the way to further reform. Watson also draws 
attention to the historical roots of the sources-of-law doctrine in different legal orders. 
It should be noted here, however, that in many cases it is just legal change that 
determines the character of the sources-of-law doctrine and not vice versa. If social, 
economic, political or ideological change gives rise to a need for a revision of the law, 
the bonds with the sources of law (whether precedents or statutes) are loosened. One 
should not over-emphasize the foreseeability of problems in a statute-law system either. 
If there is a'gap'in written law, a court will often find it difficult to engage in the sort 
of creative activity its counterpart can engage in a seemingly'retrospective'stare decisis 
system. 
b. The term pressure force refers to the organized group or groups of persons who believe 
that a benefit would result for them from a practicable change in the law. Watson says 
that the power to effect legal change that a group wields varies in accordance with the 
social and economic position of its members and its capacity to act on a particular 
source of law. Pressure forces of different constitution have varying effects upon 
15) Ibid at 323. 
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individual sources of law, and different sources respond to pressure in different ways. 
Development by legislation is much more affected by pressure forces than development 
by precedent. Watson stresses here the independence of judges in precedent-based 
systems. As judges are not elected and their role is not seen as primarily political, they 
cannot be subject to direct pressure by organized groups, nor can they easily be swayed 
by general policy issues. He adds that juristic doctrine, as a source of law, is also very 
largely immune from pressure forces, except where a pressure force has great power 
and authority (not only, e.g., an established Church, or the ruling party in a totalitarian 
state can directly and indirectly influence juristic doctrine but the doctrine itself can 
gain strength because of its connection with the dominant ideology). I think that Watson 
over-emphasizes the immunity of judges and jurists from external pressure. He says, 
for example, that a jurist's opinions would lose authority if he were directly influenced 
by a pressure force. But this pertains only to pressure forces which are motivated by 
a newly-invented idea or need. Usually there is a system of permanent pressure forces 
in society, and most lawyers belong to that system. It is important to consider whether 
or to what extent judges and jurists are susceptible to political arguments and the degree 
of participation in politics allowed to them in different systems. 
c. Opposition force is the converse of a pressure force and consists of the organized group 
or groups of persons who believe that harm will result from a proposed change in the 
law. For an opposition force to exist it is required that the group that would be adversely 
affected by the change is adequately organized. Watson remarks that although the 
persons who will be adversely affected by a suggested change in the law may be far 
more numerous than those who will benefit, the change will most likely be carried out 
if the anticipated gains of each member of the later group is extensive, whereas the 
perceived harm to each member of the former group is small. The absence of an 
organized opposition force in such a case explains why legislation which is overall 
harmful and is generally considered unpopular is sometimes passed without much 
resistance. 
d. Transplant bias, an essential element of Watson's theory that legal change primarily 
occurs through borrowing, refers to a system's receptivity to a particular foreign law 
as a matter distinct from acceptance based on a thorough assessment of al possible 
altematives.16) This receptivity varies from system to system and its extent depends on 
factors such as the linguistic tradition shared with a possible donor system, the general 
prestige which the possible donor system enjoys, the educational background and 
experience of the legal professionals in the recipient system etc. Watson also draws 
16) Transplant bias may be used to denote, for example, a system's readiness to accept a Roman law norm 
because the norm is derived from Roman law. 
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attention here to the interaction of the factors determining legal development, pointing 
out that transplant bias interacts in particular with the sources of law. The wholesale 
adoption of a foreign legal code is probably the clearest manifestation of transplant 
bias. Juristic doctrine is also very susceptible to foreign influence. This is evidenced 
by the fact that the reception of Roman law in continental Europe took place first in 
the field of legal science. Precedent, on the other hand, seems to be least affected by 
transplant bias. When judges borrow from foreign legal systems, the value of the foreign 
rule for the judge's own system is frequently carefully considered and weighed. In 
analysing transplant bias one must bear in mind that, according to Watson, law develops 
principally through the borrowing of rules and structures from elsewhere. The nature 
of this factor is that of an authoritative argument of the type: norm N is a Roman law 
norm -Roman law is superior -therefore, norm N should be accepted. Behind the 
minor premise of this inference there is no general appraisal of al norms of Roman 
law, but rather an opinion based upon the systematical coherence of the norm in 
question. The assertion'Roman law is superior'is neither deductive (i.e. based upon 
an axiom concerning the superiority of Roman law) nor inductive (then one should 
give the reasons for considering the particular norm N good), but rather quasi-inductive 
and systematical. 
e. Law-shaping lawyers are the legal elite that shapes the law and whose knowledge, 
imagination, training and experience of the world and legal ideas strongly influence 
the end product of any change in the law. Watson notes that lawyers are well placed 
to act as pressure or opposition forces. Their knowledge of how the legal system actually 
works means that they are fully aware of how the law currently in force or a change 
in it affects their well-being. But apart from that, legal professionals shape the law, in 
developed legal systems at least, in a number of ways: as members of parliamentary 
or governmental committees they are directly involved in the drafting of legislation; 
as judges they determine the shape and form of judicial precedents; as jurists they 
contribute to the development of juristic doctrine and its recognition as a source of 
law. Watson observes that although law-shaping lawyers is a factor which one could 
leave out, as their functions are adequately covered by the notions of source of law 
and transplant bias, they give law such a particular flavour that their role deserves to 
be drawn attention to. In his more recent work, Watson places much greater emphasis 
on the role of legal culture in shaping legal change. 17) 
f. The Discretion factor refers to the implicit or explicit discretion that exists either to 
17) As Watson points out, "legal change comes about through the culture of the legal elite, the lawmakers, and 
it is above al determined by that culture". The Evolution of Western Private Law, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2001, 264. 
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enforce or not to enforce the law, or to press or not to press one's legal rights. In 
Watson's words, the discretion factor has to do with'the extent to which the rules 
permit variations, or can be evaded… or need not or will not be invoked.'18) Watson 
observes that some degree of discretion is an inevitable element in any developed legal 
system. This discretion may be of individual parties, of judges, of the executive or 
actually built into the legal rules themselves. By providing choice the discretion factor 
tends to mitigate the seemingly undesirable requirements or consequences of legal 
norms, thus making the acceptance of these norms easier. Watson does not fail to note, 
however, that if discretion is abused, an adverse reaction may ensue. It is of course 
true that discretion makes choice possible, but the use of choice depends on certain 
other factors. It might be the case, for example, that a controversial parliamentary bil 
is passed as law after the most questionable paragraphs have been recast in such a way 
that would enable the judiciary or the executive to exercise discretion (e.g. open 
wording, general clauses or flexible criteria are used). This, however, transfers the 
problem to another level of decision making. At that level of micro-decision making 
the principle pertaining to the eq叫 treatmentof the subjects of law plays a much more 
important part than at the level of law-making, where the criteria of formal justice are 
introduced. From a comparative point of view it should be stressed that a mere statement 
of discretion is rarely sufficient, for discretion is exercised according to some criteria 
and not at random. To understand how the discretion factor influences the state and 
development of the law one should be able to identify both the factual and the evaluative 
criteria of discretion. 
g. The generality如ctorhas to do with the extent to which legal rules regulate more than 
one recognizable group of people or more than one transaction or factual situation. 
Watson points out that the greater the generality of law, the more difficult it is to find 
a rule that precisely fits the situation of each group, transaction or factual situation 
being regulated. He adds that the greater the generality of a proposed change in the 
law, the greater the difficulty of securing agreement on the appropriate rule or rules, 
and hence the greater the difficulty of bringing about legal change. Here attention must 
be drawn to the interaction of the factors relevant to legal change: the generality factor 
interacts to a considerable extent with the pressure or opposition forces. If the scope 
of the proposed change in the law is too narrow, the pressure force supporting it may 
be of litle influence. If, on the other hand, the scope of the proposed change is too 
broad, it is likely to cal an opposition force into being, as such a change is unlikely 
to satisfy al the groups concerned. There is also a connection between the generality 
factor and the sources of law: to carry out a legislative change a degree of generality 
is needed. In comparative studies it is useful to draw a distinction between abstract 
18)'Comparative Law and Legal Change', supra note 13, at 330. 
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generality and actual generality. There may be norms addressed'to whom it may 
concern', i.e. to anyone. Drug trafficking, e.g., may be a criminal offence and prohibited 
to everyone. In spite of the abstract character of the relevant norm, however, the 
prohibition to which it gives rise in reality concerns a relatively small number of people. 
On the other hand, there may be norms addressed to a particular group of people which 
is so large that the norms are practically general. 
h. Inertia is defined by Watson as the general absence of a sustained interest on the part 
of society and its ruling elite to struggle for the most'satisfactory'rule. For law to be 
changed there must be a sufficiently strong impulse directed through a pressure force 
operating on a source of law. This impulse must be strong enough to overcome the 
inertia. But how can inertia be explained? Watson notes that society's essential stake 
in law is order, and if order is to be maintained there can be no consuming interest in 
the precise nature of the particular rules and their reform. There is a normal desire for 
stability and society and, in particular, the dominant elite have a generalized interest 
in maintaining the existing order of things. This reflects an abstract interest in stability, 
which is linked to the fact that many legal norms have no direct impact on the lives 
of most of the citizens. According to Watson, besides the mystique surrounding law, 
there may be practical considerations stan山ngin the way of legal change. Legal 
professionals may oppose legal reforms because they would have to learn new rules 
and juristic techniques. Moreover, as every legal reform entails a considerable cost, 
priorities have to be assessed with regard to limited resources. It might be the case that 
anticipated long-term benefits may not be sufficient to justify a reform if short-term 
benefits do not outweigh the costs. Watson argues that as a factor in the relationship 
between law and society, inertia has not been given the attention it deserves. He remarks 
that, as a matter of fact, societies often tolerate much law that does not correspond to 
what is'needed'or regarded as efficient. To understand why this is so one needs to 
consider the phenomenon of legal inertia and the various elements by which it is 
composed. Legal inertia has, I think, two aspects. First, it makes a'static'justification 
of law appear sufficient: law is justified by past behaviour and behaviour by norms. 
This kind of inertia is inherent in al legal decision making which strives to maintain 
regularity and predictability in the practice of law. But apart from this aspect of inertia, 
one may speak about inertia as relating to the structure and function of law in society. 
There are two kinds of structural matters to be taken into consideration: (a) law is to 
a certain extent resistant to certain social change, and society to certain legal change, 
and (b) there is a'relative resistance'to change which pertains to the time lag between 
different functionally interdependent changes. 
i. Felt needs are the purposes which are known to, and regarded as appropriate by, a 
pressure force (not by the ruling elite or by society as a whole) that operates on a 
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source of law. Watson recognizes that elucidating what the felt needs are is not always 
easy. He says that these are discoverable through an examination of words, deeds and 
effects: what the pressure force says is needed, how its constituent elements act both 
before and after the legal change is effected, and how the change actually impacts upon 
the interests of the pressure force. There are also needs which may be general, well-
recognized and existing for a long time. But unless these are supported by an active 
pressure force they are not felt needs as understood by Watson, even though consideration 
of these'other needs'is important for anyone interested in understanding the relationship 
between law and society. It is submitted that one should not define the intentions of 
groups in such a manner that only those goals are taken into consideration which are 
laid down in the historical sources. Constructed, hypothetical models, are also needed, 
otherwise one may lose sight of probable motives of action which are not explicitly 
referred to in the sources. 
Now, how are Watson's nine'factors'to be used? He says that, by relying upon these 
factors, one may be able to devise models for legal development and the relationship between 
law and society. At the same time, by considering the interaction of these factors one can 
find answers to some of the most perplexing questions concerning legal development. There 
are balances between factors supporting change and factors opposing change. According to 
Watson, the relationship between a society and its legal rules could be roughly expressed 
as a mathematical equation: a legal rule will be stable when felt needs, weakened by the 
discretion factor, activating a pressure force as affected by the generality factor, to work on 
the relevant source of law, are less potent than inertia and opposition force combined; on 
the other hand, some legal change will occur when the force of felt needs, weakened by 
the discretion factor, activating a pressure force as affected by the generality factor, to work 
on a source of law, al as modified by the transplant bias and law-shaping lawyers, is greater 
than the force of inertia plus the opposition force. In other words, the precise relationship 
between legal norms and the society in which they operate can be expressed as the balance 
between two opposing sets of factors, the first inhibiting change, the second supporting 
change. A legal change occurs when the force of the second set of factors is greater than 
the force of the first set of factors, although the nature of the change is determined by the 
balance and relative weight of the various factors. In Watson's model one can find no direct 
reference to concepts and elements that are commonplace in modem analyses of society. 
Neither society at large nor its dominant strata are regarded as factors. Legal change is 
triggered off by pressure forces, not by society as a whole, or its ruling elite. Of course, 
the pressure force and the society, or the pressure force and the ruling elite are often 
coextensive, as he says, and in a non-democratic political system the ruling elite operates 
very directly on the principal sources of law, enjoying a kind of monopoly with respect to 
legal change. The extent to which in any country the pressure force and the society or its 
ruling elite are the same must be determined by a specific inquiry, even though one must 
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keep in mind that, even if it is society at large or its ruling elite that operates as the pressure 
force, legal rules are not necessarily the most efficient means of using social power in order 
to bring about reforms. 
Watson claims that his model can be useful in elucidating certain difficult issues 
pertaining to legal development.19) But the model is not deterministic. He points out that, 
although existing elements in a society may determine the options that are known or 
knowable, and hence available, they do not predetermine the necessary outcome. In my 
view this suggests that Watson's factors can only furnish the basis of a method of presenting 
relevant aspects of legal change in a generally valid manner. There are no objections of 
principle that could be raised against such a method. The objections are, rather, of a practical 
nature. One might argue, for example, that Watson's felt needs and pressure forces do not 
pay enough attention to the fact that there are not only supporters and opponents of a 
proposed legal change. Often there is at least a degree of unanimity concerning the necessity 
of legal reform, but there are differing opinions concerning the content of the planned 
legislation. In this case the pressure forces and relevant interests cannot be seen as 
diametrically opposite and it is thus difficult to say that the law in question would be a 
result of the goals of one interest group if it is somewhat nearer its interests than those of 
another interest group. 
Is a general theory of legal change possible? Watson says that, even if an examination 
of the various factors would show such diversity of possibilities that no general theory could 
be developed of the growth of law in the West, except perhaps on such an obvious level as 
to be nothing but banal, such a theory should be admissible in so far as it is accepted that 
it is possible to trace a pattern of development. Consider, for example, the phenomenon of 
codification. Since the eighteenth century codification has come to be almost an inevitability 
in civil law countries, but has been a relative rarity in the common law world. According 
to Watson, this pattern cannot be accounted for on the basis of unrelated facts existing in 
the different countries. Explaining codification (why it occurred at al, why it occurred in 
a particular country at the time it did and not earlier, why the code was either a new creation 
or was borrowed from elsewhere and, if the later, why the particular model was chosen), 
or the absence of itin certain systems, would presuppose consideration of the general factors 
at work when legal change takes place. It is important to note here that a general theory of 
legal change would be inductive: if al situations of legal change have been considered, then 
19) For example, it is often said that there is a close connection between commerce and law, especially the law 
of contract, and that economic growth engenders legal change. But the Scots law of contract developed rapidly 
between the years 1633 and 1665 (it was during this period that the main forms of contract and the general 
principles of contract law were recognized), even though, as is well known, this period was characterized by 
economic stagnation. By contrast, in England, which was much more developed economically and commercially, 
there could scarcely be said to be a general law of contract or general principles of contract before the nineteenth 
century. To understand this one needs to consider the interaction of the factors relevant to legal change in the 
relevant historical context. 
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some general conclusions may be drawn. But such a theory would only be nominally general: 
in reality it would include a number of different relations of events. However, there are 
some generally valid interconnections between different matters. These interconnections 
may be expressed with the help of'historical laws', but these laws are not obligatory. They 
are only'topical norms'of the type:'ifN then F will happen, unless…'One should distinguish 
here between questions of form and questions of content. It is possible to construct a set of 
forms with the purpose of explaining something. If the validity of the theory is defined in 
such a manner that it depends on the relevance of the forms, one can say that it is possible 
to construct a theory of legal change. But this is primarily a conceptual exercise: it has 
nothing or very litle to say about the contents of the concepts. The bulk of the theory would 
then consist of statements concerning possible interaction between the conceptually arranged 
matters and of statements concerning working hypotheses upon these relationships of 
interaction. An all-embracing theoretical umbrella cannot be constructed, for if the basic 
constituents of law are taken into consideration, the resulting'atomistic'theory would no 
longer be a theory of law. 
Concluding Note 
Comparative law is concerned with many more things than merely law, but its object 
is ultimately law. I think that the legal point of view needs to be stressed in these days of 
an omnipotent sociology, which, of course, has its uses. Now, the theoretical questions of 
comparative law cannot be answered only at the level of language -the questions are not 
purely semiotic. A successful translation oflegal terms, important though it may be, is hardly 
sufficient.20) Nor does the existence of certain similar social relationships constitute a 
sufficient condition for comparison, either. A conceptual framework is also needed. In other 
words, although for a meaningful comparison there must be sufficient similarity of content 
(social relationships), some kind of conceptual commensurability is also necessary.21) It is 
submitted that it is possible to compare laws and not only the structures, beliefs, interests 
etc. behind them. If the reductionistic standpoint is rejected, one is justified in seeking to 
develop general idealistic models of legal development. It is at least reasonable to hope that 
a theory of legal change based on comparative law will further insights into the growth and 
progress of law that can be acquired in no other way. In my view, the'factor analysis' 
proposed by Watson provides for an interesting starting-point. 
20) On the problem of legal translation se, e.g., P. Wit, Die Uber Ubersetzung von Rechtsbegriffen, Studia et 
Documenta Historiae et Juris XXXVII, 1971; M.H. Hoeflich,'Translation and the Reception of Foreign Law 
in the Antebellum United States', The American Journal C!f Comparative Law, 50, 2002, 753; L. Rayar, 
'Translating Legal Texts: A Methodology', Conference Paper, Euroforum, April 1993. 
21) Consider on this D. Pearce, Roads to Commensurability, 1987, 188, 194. 
